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The goal of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the factors that determine the risk premium
on bank lines of credit obtained by SMEs, and whether ﬁrm size, which may be used by banks to
segment their client base, also has an impact on credit costs. An analysis of data from 406 SMEs in
Canada showed the main determinants of risk premium were ﬁrm size, line of credit size, ability to
repay, the relationship between banker and entrepreneur, and the length of the relationship with the
bank. These determinants change according to the market segment in which the potential borrower
operates. Banks appear to use a transactional approach for smaller borrowers, where credit terms are
based on quantitative ﬁnancial data, and a relational approach for larger ﬁrms, where relationship
length and quality become signiﬁcant.
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1. Introduction
A dynamic and healthy SME sector is vital to the economies of developed and newly
industrialized countries (Wu et al., 2008), but these SMEs need outside ﬁnancing to grow,
innovate or internationalize their activities. Lack of availability of outside loans may be a
serious constraint to economic dynamism, as pointed out by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt
(2006) and Van Auken (2001), because SMEs are important job creators and contribute
continuously to innovation and competitiveness. In many countries, banks are the most
commonly used source of external ﬁnancing for SMEs.1 Yet, access to bank ﬁnancing is
regarded as a constraint for some SMEs, either because it is not available in sufﬁcient
1This conclusion was also formulated by OECD (2006) for the OECD countries, St-Pierre et al. (2001) and
Madill et al. (2002) for Canada.
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amounts or because the credit conditions are unaffordable. A Canadian study by St-Pierre
et al. (2001) examining more than 2,000 SMEs indicated the acceptance rates for medium-
and long-term loan and line of credit applications exceeded 80 percent. However, this does
not mean bank ﬁnancing is easy to obtain. The authors showed that when the entire sample
is broken down, the rate of acceptance declines substantially from 92.3 percent for ﬁrms
predicting annual sales growth of less than 20 percent, to 68.7 percent for fast growth
SMEs, namely gazelles, which are also innovative and internationalized ﬁrms. Bruns and
Fletcher (2008) argued that the main problem encountered by SMEs when trying to obtain
access to ﬁnancing is not their size but rather the availability of the information required by
the lender to assess their plans. The high cost of producing information explains why the
information asymmetry is more common among small ﬁrms than among their medium-
sized and larger counterparts. Financial theory suggests ﬁrms exhibiting less information
asymmetry and agency problems ﬁnd it easier to obtain outside capital. Therefore, it is
reasonable to think the banks may use a speciﬁc credit allocation process or speciﬁc
criteria for different client types, as shown by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), who
found the supply of funding was less plentiful in market segments with a signiﬁcant
information asymmetry, thereby pushing ﬁnancing costs upwards (D’Auria et al., 1999).
The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of the determinants of
bank ﬁnancing costs, and speciﬁcally the lines of credit obtained by SMEs. In addition, it
attempts to see whether ﬁrm size, which may be used by banks to segment their client
base, also inﬂuences line of credit costs.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it extends the empirical
evidence on the determinants of loan conditions to SMEs by examining the determinants
of risk premium in the case of bank lines of credit. Second, it uses secondary data on
Canadian SMEs to explore different business risk indicators to see whether they are linked
to risk premium. The notion of ﬁnancial risk, often explored as a separate entity in research
into SME ﬁnancing, is extended to include the overall endogenous risk that characterizes
the ﬁrm’s entire activity. Finally, it shows that SMEs do not appear to be treated as a
homogeneous group by banks, and that segmentation based on various criteria, including
size, may provide a better reﬂection of their situation, and of the behavior of their funding
providers.
To understand the determinants of loan conditions, we begin by summarizing the
principal ﬁndings presented in the literature, which we use to deﬁne our research
hypotheses.
2. The Determinants of Risk Premium on a Line of Credit
Because of their status as no-risk lenders, banks have a duty to protect their depositors’
savings when granting business loans. Therefore, loan conditions must be based on the
borrowers’ ability to repay and the risk of default. This risk depends on many factors such
as business activity, manager’s experience, ﬁrm’s historical success (Daniels and Ramirez,
2008). In this section, we will recall the determinants measured or controlled by the bank,
followed by the risks speciﬁcally related to SMEs.
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2.1. Borrowing ﬁrm’s size
Behr and Güttler (2007) reported from Plattner (2002) “that smaller companies are more prone
to insolvency than large companies because they are usually less diversiﬁed on the production
and distribution side and are more likely to face ﬁnancing restrictions.” This proposition is
taken into consideration by banks that are not allowed to grant credit to high default risk
borrowers. In an empirical study of German SMEs, Harhoff and Körting (1998) observed a
negative relationship betweenﬁrm size and interest rates, and suggested that banks use ﬁrm size
as a measure of credit risk. Lehmann and Neuberger (2000) and D’Auria et al. (1999) obtained
similar results in Italy and Germany. Strahan (1999) also stated that loan interest rates reﬂect
size differences, with larger ﬁrms that have developed their reputations and proved their staying
power being able to offer more collateral as a result. These ﬁrms borrow more, pay lower
interest rates, obtain longer-term loans and seem to provide less collateral than their smaller
counterparts. These results may also be because larger ﬁrms have greater negotiating power.
2.2. Loan size
Smaller loans tend to be given to small or newly created companies, whose risk is greater, and
therefore whose loans are subject to higher rates of default. By contrast, loans to large com-
panies tend to be lower risk because of their generally greater ﬁnancial solidity. Additionally,
large scale loans tend to undergo much more rigorous screening, thus resulting in a lower level
of credit risk (Leeth and Scott, 1989; Booth, 1992). Strahan (1999) proposes a relationship
between loan size and ﬁrm size, both of them inducing a reduction in interest rates and
collateral, possibly showing a reputation effect. For their part, Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006)
found a positive relationship between loan size and pledge of business collateral. These mixed
results on loan conditions will be considered in the model tested below.
2.3. Ability to repay and default risk
Financial risk is related to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure and its ability to meet its ﬁnancial
obligations. Cole et al. (1999) stated that large banks use standard criteria combined with
the borrower’s ﬁnancial statements when deciding whether or not to grant credit. It is also
current practice to use certain ﬁnancial ratios when assessing a borrower’s default risk and
ability to repay (Behr and Güttler, 2007). The presence of debt or loan contracts increases
ﬁnancial risk, and is often the principal factor used by ﬁnancial institutions when con-
sidering loan applications. However, a heavy debt load does not necessarily mirror a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial risk; Norton (1991), inspired by the theory of managerial choice, suggested a
heavy debt load might reﬂect the entrepreneurs’ expectations, ﬁnancial preferences and
desire for development. Debt load needs to be accompanied by an ability to repay;
otherwise it may be considered as an important addition to the ﬁrm’s risk.
2.4. Collateral/guarantees
With SMEs, collateral can be provided by the business or owner-manager (Bruns and
Fletcher, 2008). On a theoretical basis, the use of personal or business collateral should
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decrease the lender’s risk and hence, improve ﬁnancing conditions (Voordeckers and
Steijvers, 2006). However, this depends on how risk is divided between moral hazard,
adverse selection and other elements of risk in the contract. When moral hazard risk is
high, the bank may insist on a personal commitment from the owner-manager in addition
to company guarantees, ensuring alignment of interests between bank and borrower and
reducing monitoring costs for the bank (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004). Owner-managers
who commit their personal assets and cash in exchange for a company loan and accept a
personal guarantee clause will be more inclined to use the money for the reasons set out in
the loan application, as prescribed in the ﬁnancing contract (Bruns and Fletcher, 2008).
But use of personal or business collateral is a signal of high probability of default and is
not associated with reduced risk premium. Collateral is the central mechanism by which
banks adjust risk and gain access to a borrower’s assets in the event of default (Storey,
1994). This hypothesis is supported by the recent ﬁndings of Hernandez-Canovas and
Martinez-Solano (2006), which showed banks use collateral to control presumed risk,
because young, small, more indebted and less solvent ﬁrms are more likely to be asked to
guarantee their loans. On the other hand, banks may also ask businesses to pledge more
and better collateral to signal their low risk. Hulburt and Scherr (2003) found a positive
relationship between ﬁrm size and collateral. Finally, if collateral is used to signal a
borrower’s risk, we should anticipate its value will decrease over the length of the bank-
ﬁrm relationship (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006).
2.5. Quality and length of the bank–business relationship
Information asymmetry problems can be reduced signiﬁcantly through a better relationship
between bank and ﬁrm, and by a climate of trust leading to a good business relationship.
The relationship is based on “soft” information, such as reputation and personal contacts.
However, Berger and Udell (2002) point out that the principal relationship exists between
the banker and the entrepreneur, not the bank and the ﬁrm. Madill et al. (2002) demon-
strate that an owner-manager’s satisfaction with his/her banking relationship is dependent
on an afﬁnity with the account manager and the bank’s management staff. Harhoff and
Körting (1998), in a study based on a sample of German SMEs, showed mutual trust
between banker and entrepreneur had a signiﬁcant negative impact on line of credit interest
rates. It is reasonable to think the information asymmetry should decrease over time as the
relationship between banker and entrepreneur develops, leading to better loan conditions.
Although a number of authors have observed similar results (D’Auria et al., 1999; Boot and
Thakor, 2000), other ﬁndings are less convincing (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Lehmann and
Neuberger, 2000) and show the length of the relationship can be associated with increased
credit availability but not improved ﬁnancing conditions.
2.6. Owner-manager’s characteristics
Fernando et al. (2002) suggested the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s owner-manager seem to
be the main determinant in the decision to grant bank credit. They further stated that the
entrepreneur’s expertise appears to play the most discriminating role in such decisions.
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We can anticipate this expertise and past experience could reduce SMEs risk (Bruns and
Fletcher, 2008) and, proportionately, the risk-related premium.
Therefore, the literature shows that in their evaluation of borrower risk, banks ascribe a
great deal of importance to ﬁrm size and ﬁnancial results, available collateral from the ﬁrm
and from the entrepreneur (proxy for his personal commitment), the quality of the business
relationship with the ﬁrm and the owner-manager’s characteristics. This leads us to the
following hypothesis:
H1: The risk premium is determined by the ﬁrm’s ability to repay and its default risk, the
quality and length of the bank-ﬁrm relationship, the collateral/guarantees it is able to pro-
vide, the credit line size, the borrowing ﬁrm’s size and the owner-manager’s characteristics.
In the Basel II Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004), loans to
SMEs are treated differently from loans to large ﬁrms, in that they require “less regulatory
capital” for comparable default potential. Loans to SMEs appear to be less sensitive to
systematic risk, and the default risk is largely idiosyncratic, or ﬁrm-speciﬁc (Jacobson
et al., 2005). Accordingly, Basel II could have the effect of enhancing credit cost differ-
ences based on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk (Aubier, 2007).
Furthermore, Psillaki et al. (2010) illustrated the potential use of non-ﬁnancial indi-
cators representing internal ﬁrm factors (e.g. managerial indicators) as part of the bank’s
credit risk assessment. Nieuwenhuizen and Kroon (2003) suggested the criteria used by
banks should include entrepreneur success factors such as the owner-manager’s knowl-
edge and skills, market orientation, ﬁnancial determinants and variables speciﬁc to crea-
tivity and innovation. The next section examines factors found in the literature associated
with SME endogenous risk, and leads to our second hypothesis.
3. Identifying Elements of Default for SMEs
In addition to the owner-manager’s risk, the lender’s risk is related to the total risk of the
borrowing ﬁrm, which may compromise the ﬁrm’s cash reserve and its ability to meet its
ﬁnancial commitments. It can be divided into two elements, namely ﬁnancial risk and
business risk. Financial risk refers to the ﬁrm’s ability to repay and its default risk. Inherent
business risk, also referred to as operational risk, can be broken down into commercial
risk, management risk and technological/production risk. The literature on SME business
risk is not extensive, and its components can be found in research into the determinants of
company bankruptcy (Psillaki et al., 2010). To identify the different components of
business risk, we focused on the owner-managers’ actions and methods that had an impact
on turnover, production and operation costs, and proﬁtability, thereby supporting the
position taken by Psillaki et al. (2010) to the effect that ﬁnancial data do not show the
causes of future problems and, therefore, have only limited predictive capability. These
various determinants all have an impact on the ﬁrm’s ability to release the ﬂow of money
required to cover the ﬁnancial cost of bank ﬁnancing. We will be taking an “exploratory”
approach for these variables, in that they have never been used before in the context of
bank ﬁnancing.
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Commercial risk derives from the elements that inﬂuence sales and their stability.
Among other things, it depends on the ﬁrm’s market orientation and the ﬁrm’s desire to
stand out from its competitors. For SMEs, commercial risk can be expressed by the quality
of its customer relations, awareness of customer needs, marketing scanning and analyses
of competitors’ reactions (Raymond and St-Pierre, 2004; Sharmistha, 1999).
Technological/production risk is related, among other things, to the ﬁrm’s production
structure, which determines the cost of its products and ensures its competitive capacity. It
includes the absence of cost-control and quality monitoring systems, integration of pro-
duction systems/equipment, lack of technology scanning activities, the extent of techno-
logical equipment development and so on (Swink et al., 2005).
Managerial risk is related to the ﬁrm’s management activities that impact their efﬁciency
and, by extension, their proﬁt margin. Empirical research has shown management practices
have a signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrm’s ability to obtain bank credit (Zinger et al., 2001).
Psillaki et al. (2010) also acknowledged the impact of managerial deﬁciencies on vulner-
ability and showed they can be a good predictor of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial risk. Management risk
includes lack of managerial skills, shortage of human resources, inability to delegate certain
management decisions, inappropriate use of management tools (cash budget, costing system,
account collection policy), etc. The owner-manager is often specialized in one particular
function and has little interest, or may even be inept, in other strategic aspects of the
organization (Scherr et al., 1993). Indeed, this is one of the arguments used by bankers to
support the supposed greater risk of SMEs where management is centralized around the
owner-manager. Moreover, Bruns and Fletcher (2008) found a positive relationship between
competency and the probability that a lending ofﬁcer will support an SME’s loan request.
This breakdown of overall risk provides a more accurate picture of the risk and features
of the borrowing ﬁrm. All of these elements will be introduced into our second hypothesis,
where the risk premium is determined by the elements in the ﬁrst hypothesis, as well as by
those speciﬁc to SME’s risk. Our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: The risk premium is determined by the ﬁrm’s ability to repay and its default risk, the
quality and length of the bank-ﬁrm relationship, the collateral/guarantees it is able to
provide, the credit line size, the borrowing ﬁrm’s size, the owner-manager’s characteristics
and the borrowing ﬁrm’s speciﬁc risk.
4. Methodology and Findings
To test our research hypotheses, we used a private database that contains information on
406 Canadian manufacturing SMEs with between 10 and 450 employees.2 Data were
collected between 1999 and 2007 from ﬁrms during a diagnostic activity offered by a
university research laboratory. Firms were contacted by an intermediary, to provide an
assurance the information would remain conﬁdential, and were asked to provide the data
by completing a 15-page questionnaire and attaching their ﬁnancial statements from the
preceding ﬁve years. In exchange for this information, the ﬁrms obtained a benchmark
2In Canada, manufacturing SME refer to businesses with fewer than 500 employees (OECD, 1997).
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report they could use to identify potential avenues for improving their performance or
reducing their vulnerability. The ﬁrms were all located in the Province of Québec and
operated in different traditional (i.e. non high-tech) manufacturing sectors. The data used
for the tests were secondary data, which may have affected the accuracy of some indicator
measurements. This was taken into account in the analysis and in the presentation of the
study’s limitations.
The database information relates to the entrepreneur, the ﬁrm’s organizational structure, its
products and markets, technological development, information systems use, production sys-
tems, the level of ﬁnancial management sophistication, ﬁnancial data over the last ﬁve years,
bank credit conditions and the entrepreneur’s opinion of the lending institution and banker (see
Appendix for the deﬁnition of some of the variables used in this study). Considering the
context of data collection, we could not pretend to represent Canadian manufacturing SMEs.
Table 1 presents values related to general information on the ﬁrms in the sample used for the
factor analysis and regressions, as well as the two sub-groups used to test some possible size
effect on credit conditions. The ﬁrms are fairly old and generally of medium size.
The database contains many different risk indicators that should help to measure the
SMEs’ total risk. We have retained the information that can be used to assess the default
risk and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, as suggested by Basel II. Given that several aspects of the
risk described above could be measured by several different variables, we used principal
component analysis to create one factor for each category (Table 2). The ﬁve factors
identiﬁed show KMO values greater than 0.6 (Hair et al., 1995). Reliability is measured by
Cronbach’s alpha for which different studies have shown that a value greater than 0.6 is
acceptable (Nunnally, 1978). Nevertheless, in exploratory studies, alpha lower than the 0.6
threshold are acceptable (Riel and Bruggen, 2003), justifying our decision to keep a factor,
associated with technological/production risk, with a value of 0.58.
These ﬁve factors were retained for the regression analysis, along with seven other
variables used to measure ﬁrm size, collateral/guarantees, loan characteristics and the
quality and length of the relationship between institution and ﬁrm and between banker and
entrepreneur. Firm size was measured based on the sales log (to respect normality criterion),
while collateral/guarantees was measured according to the ratio of accounts receivable
and stocks to total assets and the use of a personal guarantee. Loan characteristics3 were
Table 1. Some general characteristics of the sample.
Mean
(N ¼ 406)
Median
(N ¼ 406)
Median the smallest
(Sales <¼ 3M)
(N ¼ 138)
Median the largest
(Sales >¼ 5M)
(N ¼ 203)
Total sales (M $) 7.72 5.25 1.87 9.52
Total number of employees 57.15 43.50 21.50 69.00
Age of the ﬁrm 30.13 30.16 25.00 30.16
Bank indebtedness ratio 34% 34% 36% 33%
Average net proﬁt margin 3.7% 3.8% 3.3% 3.9%
3Loan characteristics probably merit a degree of scrutiny that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
The Determinants of Risk Premium: Bank Lines of Credit Granted to SMEs 465
measured according to size of line of credit. The quality of the relationship between bank
and ﬁrm was assessed based on the entrepreneur’s answers to certain speciﬁc questions (see
Appendix), and the length of the relationship was measured in number of years. The risk
premium, used in this study as a dependent variable, is a ﬂoating rate required on a line of
credit.4 The standardized regression results are presented in Table 3.
The ﬁrst model, used to test our ﬁrst hypothesis, shows the contribution of ﬁrm size,
credit line size, the ability to repay and the default risk, the relationship between banker
and entrepreneur and the length of their relationship to the determination of the risk
premium. These signiﬁcant negative relationships are entirely expected. On the other hand,
Table 2. Principal component analysis results: Risk components and risk indicators.
Risk components Indicators Loadings
(N ¼ 406)
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Managerial risk Use of management and computer-based planning tools 0.7710 0.60
Use of accounting and ﬁnancial management tools 0.7234
% of functions with a designated responsible 0.5626
Presence of a board of directors, advisory committee or a
successor
0.5983
Technological and
production risk
Cost controls: internal breakdown 0.8303 0.58
Cost controls: external breakdown 0.8085
Control of logistical costs 0.5209
Overall integration of the production system 0.4217
Measure of continuous improvement 0.4215
Commercial risk Frequency of customer complaints processing 0.4258 0.73
Frequency of market surveys involving current
customers
0.6989
Frequency of market surveys involving potential
customers
0.7436
Frequency of competition analyses 0.7328
Frequency of customer/market prospecting 0.6798
Frequency of analyses of sales representatives’ reports 0.6250
Ability to repay
and default
risk
Safety margin 0.6121 0.76
Ratio: cash ﬂow/total assets 0.5721
Net proﬁt margin (3-year average) 0.6853
Interest coverage ratio 0.7076
Perceived proﬁtability 0.7301
Perceived liquidity 0.7550
Owner-manager’s
characteristics
Experience at the head of the ﬁrm (number of years) 0.91817 0.81
Experience in the sector (number of years) 0.91817
4Risk premia are relatively independent from economic conditions. In time of economic slowdowns, banks reduce
the supply-side ﬁnancing to riskier SMEs, thereby restricting the number of ﬁrms that will have access to credit.
Furthermore, the ﬁnancing cost is adjusted by the base lending rate and not by the risk premium added to that rate.
The median risk premium in the period covered by our study (1999–2007) remained stable around 1%, which is
similar to the premium currently reported in the economy. Given that all of the sampled ﬁrms already have a bank
line of credit, we can argue that our ﬁndings remain valid in the current context of world ﬁnancial crisis.
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the collateral/guarantees, the entrepreneur’s personal commitment and the owner-man-
ager’s characteristics were found to play no signiﬁcant role.
Note that, as well as creating certain multicollinearity problems, the addition of two
interaction variables to the model, one between the ﬁrm size and the credit line size and the
other between the length of the bank-business relationship and the collateral provided by
the entrepreneur, did not improve results. For these reasons, we have decided to exclude
them from the model so as to allow a simpler interpretation of the direct relations between
the variables.
As suggested in the literature, size has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on credit evaluation for
SMEs (Harhoff and Körting, 1998; D’Auria et al., 1999; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2000),
because it is easily observable and reﬂects both the information asymmetry and the bor-
rower’s reputation. To test its signiﬁcance, we removed it from the model and found a
decrease in the adjusted regression coefﬁcient (0.287 to 0.260, see model 3).5 If we remove
size variables from the model (loan and ﬁrm), we notice a signiﬁcant decrease in the
adjusted regression coefﬁcient (0.287 to 0.198, see model 4), but the role of business
collateral becomes signiﬁcant, implying its probable substitution with ﬁrm size.
Table 3. Combined inﬂuence of risk indicators on the risk premium of an SME line of credit.
Model 1
(N ¼ 406)
Model 2
(N ¼ 406)
Model 3
(N ¼ 406)
Model 4
(N ¼ 406)
Intercept 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Borrowing ﬁrm’s size
Sales log 0.236*** 0.236***
Loan characteristics
Credit line size 0.124* 0.123* 0.263***
Ability to repay and default risk (factor) 0.254*** 0.248*** 0.283*** 0.286***
Collateral/guarantees
Business collateral (Ratio of accounts recei-
vable and stock to total assets)
0.043 0.050 0.071 0.084***
Entrepreneur’s commitment (collateral
values on line of credit granted)
0.038 0.040 0.038 0.020
Quality/length of the bank-business relationship
Quality of the relationship with the banker 0.163** 0.156* 0.163* 0.166*
Quality of the relationship with the institution 0.034 0.039 0.044 0.057
Length of the relationship
Number of years with the institution 0.143** 0.145** 0.179*** 0.180***
Owner-manager’s characteristics (factor) 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.015
Business Risk
Managerial risk (factor) 0.010 0.020 0.079
Technological and production risk (factor) 0.059 0.066 0.095
Commercial risk (factor) 0.048 0.044 0.025
R2 0.303 0.308 0.280 0.218
R2 adjusted 0.288 0.287 0.260 0.198
Fischer Test 19.20*** 14.59*** 13.94*** 11.02***
Note: * p < 0:05; **p < 0:01; ***p < 0:001.
5Correlation between ﬁrm size and loan size is 0.65. This is similar to the results of Cziraky et al. (2005).
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Finally, we conﬁrm the length of the relationship with a ﬁnancial institution has a
signiﬁcant negative impact on risk premium, leading to better loan conditions (D’Auria
et al., 1999; Boot and Thakor, 2000), and this inﬂuence is robust and stable in all four
models. We also complete Madill et al.’s (2002) results with the signiﬁcance of satis-
faction or quality of the relationship with the banker (not the institution) in the reduction of
risk premium.
To test the second hypothesis, we added the business risk components to model 1 and
observed the variation in the adjusted regression coefﬁcient (model 2). We found a small
decrease in the adjusted regression coefﬁcient between the ﬁrst and second models (from
0.288 to 0.287), and no signiﬁcant relationship between business risk and risk premium.
This ﬁnding did not conﬁrm our second hypothesis, to the effect that the risk premium is
determined from the borrower’s overall risk, measured in part through its commercial,
technological/production and management aspects. The absence of signiﬁcant links may
be explained by the deﬁnitions used; as previously mentioned, they were not fully justiﬁed
in the literature, which was somewhat tight-lipped on the subject. Nevertheless, ﬁrm size,
ability to repay and default risk, credit line size and length of the relationship with banker
were still fairly signiﬁcant.
Studying default probabilities in SMEs, Dietsch and Petey (2004) distinguished two
different segments inside the SME population: very small and small SMEs and large
SMEs. To see whether the risk premium determinants differed with ﬁrm size, we divided
the sample into three groups based on sales. The ﬁrst group was composed of ﬁrms with
sales of less than $3 million, the second with sales between $3 and $5 million, and the
third of ﬁrms with sales of more than $5 million.
We began with median difference tests between the smaller ﬁrms (sales< $3M) and the
larger ﬁrms (sales> $5M). Table 4 shows there is a signiﬁcant difference in ﬁnancing
conditions based on ﬁrm size. This conﬁrms the results of Harhoff and Körting (1998),
D’Auria et al. (1999), Strahan (1999) and Lehmann and Neuberger (2000). Lower credit
line size and costly ﬁnancing conditions are imposed on smaller ﬁrms for a default risk that
is not signiﬁcantly greater than that of larger ﬁrms. The results show that the largest ﬁrms
(even though they are still regarded as SMEs) had dealt with their ﬁnancial institutions for
much longer, suggesting diminished information asymmetry might be responsible for their
more favorable ﬁnancing conditions, and conﬁrming the observations of Manoj and
Edmister (1999). The ﬁrms’ ability to negotiate with the banks, which improves as the ﬁrm
matures (Van Auken, 2001), may also explain the more favorable conditions granted to the
larger ﬁrms. In addition, we found that loans offered to bigger ﬁrms were more collateralized
than those to smaller ﬁrms (signiﬁcant at 10%). These results are similar to those of Hulburt
and Scherr (2003), conﬁrming the confusing role of collateral.
Loan conditions differ signiﬁcantly for ﬁrms of different sizes. Does this mean loan
conditions, especially the cost of credit, are determined differently for smaller and larger
ﬁrms? To verify this, we redid the regressions presented in Table 3, dividing our sample
into three groups, namely SMEs with sales of less than $3 million, sales between $3 and
$5 million, and those with sales of $5 million or more. The results presented in Table 5
show a signiﬁcant link between business collateral and risk premium in the group of
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smaller ﬁrms, and no signiﬁcant relation for larger and mean size ﬁrms. Bearing in mind
banks are inclined to ask for greater guarantees from higher risk borrowers (Jiménez and
Saurina, 2004), this last result might suggest banks consider smaller ﬁrms riskier than
larger ones. Furthermore, we found a signiﬁcant link between default risk and the risk
premium for all groups.
No signiﬁcant relation was found between ﬁrm size and risk premium for the three
subsamples. However, credit line size is signiﬁcantly linked to the risk premium of smaller
and mean size ﬁrms, while length of the relationship with the institution is signiﬁcant only
for the mean size ﬁrms and larger ﬁrms. For larger ﬁrms, the quality of the relationship
with the banker also has a signiﬁcant bearing. Our results are similar to those of Berlin and
Mester (1998) who indicate how relationship lending can lead to loan rate smoothing over
time.
Thus, banks seem to use a different approach, based on SME size, when determining
loan conditions. The larger the size of the ﬁrm, the more important the role played by
relational variables in reducing the risk premium. Given that the context of smaller ﬁrms is
more conducive to information asymmetry, particularly because of their limited experience
and limited expertise in ﬁnancial management, the banks may have more justiﬁcation to
use a more formal approach when deciding on their ﬁnancing conditions, i.e. by using
more quantitative indicators such as the ability to repay. The banks’ management over-
heads may also justify the use of quantitative data for decisions concerning small loans. In
this respect, Allen et al. (2004) observed that loans granted to smaller ﬁrms are costlier for
the banks than loans to larger ﬁrms because of the management time and effort involved.
In this case, the banks prefer a transactional approach based on hard data and quantiﬁable
criteria. Thus, smaller SMEs are subject to a somewhat more transactional approach and a
Table 4. Firm size, loan conditions, lending relationships and default risk indicators.
Description of the variable Sales< $3M (N ¼ 138) Sales> $5M (N ¼ 203) Median difference test
Median Mean Median Mean Stat. Prob.
Bank risk premium (variable rate) 1.000 0.012 0.750 0.698 101.33 <0.0001
Business collateral (Ratio of
accounts receivable and stock
to total assets)
0.438 0.456 0.497 0.513 62.00 0.0670
Credit line size (M $) 0.200 0.281 1.246 1.803 12.40 <0.0001
Length (number of years) of the
relationship between the
business and the ﬁnancial
institution
10.000 9.286 10.474 11.582 55.17 0.0001
Quality of the relationship with
the ﬁnancial institution
0.744 0.727 0.744 0.762 69.16 0.4620
Quality of the relationship with
the banker
0.719 0.696 0.719 0.748 65.54 0.2000
Safety margin (number of days) 24.22 39.53 27.33 33.82 66.00 0.2688
Cash ﬂow/total assets 0.070 0.085 0.090 0.098 65.00 0.2014
Net proﬁt margin (3 year average) 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.037 68.00 0.4302
Interest coverage ratio 0.710 0.737 0.780 0.852 63.00 0.1007
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relational approach is favored for larger businesses, where the length of the relationship
can substitute for the use of personal or organizational guarantees, as was observed by
Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006).
The results show that different components of business risk are taken into consideration
for ﬁrms of different sizes, suggesting the ﬁnancial institutions do in fact consider the non-
ﬁnancial characteristics of borrowers when deciding on ﬁnancing conditions. This is
consistent with the recommendations made in the Basel II Accords. For the medium-sized
ﬁrms in our sample, the components of managerial risk, reﬂecting the ﬁrms’ managerial
abilities, caused the risk premium to be reduced, while an overly strong customer
development orientation had the opposite effect. This latter ﬁnding supports the idea
proposed by Myers (1977 in Psillaki et al., 2010) to the effect that an overly strong growth
orientation may be associated with more signiﬁcant risk-taking in the SME’s strategy and
hence, a greater perceived credit risk for the banks. Among larger SMEs, technological
and production risk is linked to the risk premium, through more intense control over costs
associated with technology and production. Because the larger ﬁrms are generally older
and have a broader range of activities, they also probably have achieved greater managerial
maturity; therefore, explaining the non-signiﬁcant role played by this indicator. Our
ﬁndings in this respect are consistent with those of Orser et al. (2000), who observed less
managerial expertise in smaller ﬁrms than in larger ﬁrms.
The range of ﬁndings obtained when the ﬁrms are split into different size categories
conﬁrms the complexity of loan conditions and also may help explain some of the con-
tradictions found in the literature. It also generates a number of research questions we will
present in the next section.
5. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
The goal of this research was to gain a better understanding of the determinants of the
bank risk premium for SMEs. In our study, risk premium determinants have been
deﬁned using endogenous variables to the ﬁrm, without taking into account the bank credit
supply. Economic conditions will inﬂuence this supply by tightening access to credit
during periods of economic turmoil but will not affect the risk premium charged to
borrowers.
Our study of the sample revealed that the determinants of risk premium are ﬁrm size,
line of credit size, ability to repay, the relationship between the banker and the entre-
preneur and the length of the relationship with the bank. We used the SME classiﬁcation
presented by Dietsch and Petey (2004) in their study of default probability to divide our
sample into three groups, based on ﬁrm size, to see whether credit conditions and risk
premium determinants would differ from one category to the next. We found signiﬁcant
differences in credit conditions between the smaller and larger ﬁrms, in terms of the risk
premium paid, the guarantees given and the size of the line of credit. In addition, our
results suggest the banks use a transactional approach with smaller ﬁrms, in that their
decisions are determined mainly by payment ability, line of credit size and guarantees. The
results also show the banks tend to change their approach as ﬁrm size increases, since
The Determinants of Risk Premium: Bank Lines of Credit Granted to SMEs 471
guarantees are no longer a determinant of risk premium for medium-sized and larger
SMEs. However, relational variables and variables speciﬁc to ﬁrm risk become signiﬁcant
in determining the risk premium, in line with the recommendations made in the Basel II
Accords.
Although the data used in this study are Canadian, our research model has been
developed based on a literature review of research dealing with bank ﬁnancing of SMEs in
several countries. Furthermore, Canadian ﬁnancial institutions use standardized valuation
models, which are comparable to those used in most industrialized countries. Thus, we can
argue our ﬁndings have an international scope and could be used by other researchers in
building research models adapted to their countries. Furthermore, because our study
focuses on bank risk premium rather than the access to bank credit, our ﬁndings and
conclusions remain relevant even in periods of economic crisis. Therefore, entrepreneurs
would beneﬁt greatly from developing a good relationship with their bankers and from
building a climate of trust so as to reduce the information asymmetry and obtain better
credit conditions. This was shown by Scott (2006), among others, in a study of the beneﬁts
lost by SMEs when their bankers left their institution. Additional research is required to
understand the true role of the informational context between banker and entrepreneur in
determining loan conditions.
Although loan conditions should reﬂect the borrower’s risk, risk identiﬁcation and
measurement models must take all SME characteristics into account. The higher debt load
of smaller ﬁrms is not a perfect indicator of repayment/default risk because it may also
reﬂect an entrepreneur’s desire to maintain full control over the development and future of
his/her ﬁrm. Clearly, more research of this kind is needed to shed light on the determinants
of SME risk and ability to repay the lenders who ﬁnance their activities. Further research
should take into consideration the activity sector and innovative level of the ﬁrms in
question, both of which have been identiﬁed as having an inﬂuence on entrepreneurs’
satisfaction with the banking system (St-Pierre et al., 2001). Furthermore, a better
understanding of the speciﬁc risk presented by a ﬁrm would help reduce adverse selection
problems, leading to a more accurate assessment and more effective management of the
ﬁrm through certain mitigating elements. This, in turn, should lower the business risk and
the risk to the lender, improve loan conditions and foster the ﬁrm’s development.
In addition, as with most exploratory studies, this research has a number of limitations,
the main one being its external validity. The sample is non-probabilistic and therefore, is
not representative of all manufacturing ﬁrms. Finally, the use of secondary data also
introduces a number of limitations in measuring the different variables in our model
because SME speciﬁc risk is probably more complex than the level captured by the current
variables.
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Appendix
Table A1. Deﬁnition of variables.
Variable Measure
Management risk
% of functions with a desig-
nated head
% of the executive functions (production, marketing/sales, ﬁnance/accounting,
quality assurance, R&D, and human resources management) carried out by
a designated head other than the CEO.
Use of management and
computer-based planning
tools
Sum of the number of management and computer-based planning tools used
among the following: projected ﬁnancial statements, cash budget, invest-
ment evaluation, costing practices, production planning, client accounts
management, supplier accounts management, inventory management. If the
tool is used, the variable¼ 1; if the tool is not used, the variable¼ 0. Each
variable is counterbalanced by 0.625 so as to obtain a total index on 5.
Use of accounting and ﬁnan-
cial management tools
Sum of the number of accounting and ﬁnancial management tools used among
the following: cash budget, costing system, projected ﬁnancial statements.
Number of tools for which an answer is given.
Technological and production risk
Cost controls: internal break-
down Cost controls:
external breakdown Con-
trol of logistical costs
How often are these costs controlled: 1 (never) to 5 (often). How often are these
costs controlled: 1 (never) to 5 (often). Sum of control frequency for the
cost of the following logistics activities: production, procurement and
supplies, marketing and sales, stocking and handling, transportation,
packing and shipping/Number of activities for which a response is given.
1¼ never controlled 5¼ always controlled
Overall integration of pro-
duction systems
Number of production systems integrated by production type: single-unit order,
small lots, mass, or continuous.
Measure of continuous
improvement
General indicator measuring continuous improvement activities: stocks,
production/maintenance, quality, standardization and security. Calculation
method: (stock improvement measurement indicatorþ quality improvement
measurement indicatorþ standardization improvement measurement
indicatorþ security improvement measurement indicator)/(5*number
of available indicators)
Commercial risk
Frequency of… How often do the following activities occur: dealing with customer complaints,
market surveying involving current customers, market surveying involving
potential customers, competition analysis, customer/market prospecting,
analyses of sales representatives’ reports? 1 (weak) to 5 (strong).
Ability to repay and default risk
Safety Margin Ratio of available liquidity (cash þ unused line of credit) to total daily dis-
bursements by the ﬁrm.
Interest coverage ratio Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest costs.
Perceived proﬁtability Answer to the question: As a manager, in comparison to your competition or in
relation to businesses that you consider similar to yours, how do you
perceive your organization’s proﬁtability level over the last 3 years: 1
(highly inferior) to 5 (highly superior)?
Perceived liquidity Answer to the question: As a manager, in comparison to your competition or in
relation to businesses that you consider similar to yours, how do you
perceive your organization’s liquidity: 1 (highly inferior) to 5 (highly
superior)?
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